Price formation in call auctions with insider information by Bruenner, Tobias
Studies in Econom
ics and Finance
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price Formation in Call Auctions with Insider Information 
 
 
Journal: Studies in Economics and Finance 
Manuscript ID SEF-02-2018-0066.R3 
Manuscript Type: Research Paper 
Keywords: 
transaction costs, asymmetric information, Bayesian econometrics, 
informational efficiency 
  
 
 
Submission to Studies in Economics and Finance
Studies in Econom
ics and Finance
Price Formation in Call Auctions with Insider
Information
Abstract
Purpose: This study investigates -theoretically and empirically- if call auc-
tions incorporate asymmetric information into prices.
Design/methodology/approach: First, this study introduces a new model
of price formation in a call auction with insider information. In this call auction
model, insider trading gives rise to an asymmetric information component of
transaction costs. Next, this study estimates the model using twenty stocks
from Euronext Paris and investigates if the asymmetric information component
is present.
Findings: The theoretical analysis reveals that call auctions incorporate
asymmetric information into prices. The empirical analysis finds strong evi-
dence for the asymmetric information component. Testable implications pro-
vide further support for the model.
Practical implications: Call auctions have recently been proposed as an
alternative to continuous limit order book markets to overcome problems associ-
ated with high frequency trading. However, it is still an open question whether
call auctions efficiently aggregate asymmetric information. The findings of this
study imply that call auctions facilitate price discovery and, therefore, are a
viable alternative to continuous limit order book markets.
Originality/value: There is no generally accepted measure of trading costs
for call auctions. Therefore, the measure introduced in this study is of great
value to anyone who wants to (i) quantify trading costs in call auctions; (ii)
understand the determinants of trading costs in call auctions; or (iii) compare
trading costs and their components between continuous markets and call auc-
tions. This study also contributes to the literature devoted to estimating the
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probability of information-based trading.
JEL Classification: D82, G14, C11
Key words: transaction costs, asymmetric information, Bayesian econometrics,
informational efficiency
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1 Introduction
During the last couple of years problems associated with high frequency trading have
become a major concern. High frequency trading leads to excessive and inefficient
investment in speed; it increases the cost of liquidity provision; and it is a cause
of market instability. As a solution to these problems, several studies propose to
replace th continuous limit order book market with frequent call auctions (Budish,
Cramton, and Shim, 2014, Budish, Cramton, and Shim, 2015, Farmer and Skouras,
2012, Wah and Wellman, 2013). In a call auction, orders that arrive within a given
time interval are accumulated in the order book. At the end of that time interval
orders are executed at the same time and at the same price. This uniform transaction
price is chosen to maximize the quantity of shares that are traded.
Whereas call auctions can solve the problems mentioned above, it is not clear
if they perform as good as continuous limit order book markets in terms of price
discovery. Price discovery is the process by which transaction prices adjust to new
information. Imperfect price discovery favours traders with superior information at
the expense of uninformed traders. In a continuous limit order book market there
are two parties to each transaction: a liquidity trader who submits a limit order to
the order book and a second trader who accepts the limit order. Liquidity traders
are worried that their orders are picked up by traders with superior information.
To protect themselves from this adverse selection problem, they adjust their limit
prices to reflect the possibility that their counterpart in this transaction has superior
information (Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari, 2003).
In a call auction the transaction price and quantities are determined by the
interplay of many market participants. It is therefore not obvious if liquidity traders
face a similar adverse selection problem and if so, how they can protect themselves
against it. According to Pagano and Schwartz (2003) ‘the call auction is the least
understood of the three major trading regimes’ (p. 440). Empirical evidence from
the opening auction at the London Stock Exchange suggests that the call auction is
not suitable when information asymmetries are large (Ellul, Shin, and Tonks, 2005).
The aim of this study is to empirically assess the call auction’s ability to aggregate
1
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asymmetric information. To this end we present a simple model of price formation in
a call auction with insider trading. Based on this model, we derive a new measure of
transaction costs in call auctions and decompose transaction costs into a difference in
valuation part and an asymmetric information part. These components are similar
to the ones obtained by Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2003) for the bid-ask spread in
continuous limit order book markets. The model provides the testable implication
that the difference in valuation component is decreasing in liquidity whereas the
asymmetric information component is not directly affected by liquidity.
We illustrate the estimation of the model using data from a trading category at
Euronext Paris that comprises stocks that are only traded in morning and afternoon
call auctions without a continuous trading phase inbetween.1 This trading category
has received little attention in the literature so far.2
The main result of the call auction model is that the asymmetric information
impact is reflected in the liquidity traders’ limit prices and thus translates into
the transaction price. This will give rise to an asymmetric information component
of transaction costs. The remaining part of transaction costs is the difference in
valuation component.
The empirical analysis supports the results of the model. The call auction model
with asymmetric information explains the data significantly better than a model that
ignores the presence of insider information for 19 out of 20 stocks. The fact that the
estimated difference in valuation component is greater than previous estimates for
continuous limit order book markets indicates that liquidity traders incorporate the
asymmetric information impact in their limit prices. The empirical analysis confirms
the testable implication. The difference in valuation component is decreasing in
liquidity but there is no relationship between the asymmetric information component
and liquidity.
1If call auctions are combined with continuous trading, traders –apart from selecting limit prices
and order quantities– have the additional choice of the trading mechanism. Brooks and Su (1997)
show that liquidity traders can reduce trading costs by trading at the opening call and not waiting
for continuous trading to start.
2A notable exception is Venkataraman and Waisburd (2007).
2
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This study is related to Kyle (1989) and Madhavan (1992). Both of these stud-
ies show that in Bayes-Nash equilibrium call auction prices aggregate asymmetric
information. Whereas Madhavan (1992) assumes that all traders hold different but
equally valuable information, Kyle (1989) distinguishes between informed and un-
informed traders, which is closer to the setup of the present study. The theoretical
models of these two studies do not lend themselves to estimation and it is there-
fore not obvious that the positive properties of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of these
models also materialize in real world call auctions. The model in the present study
shares the basic features of these two studies, but it goes further in that it allows
for direct estimation of transaction costs as well as the decomposition of transac-
tion costs into the difference valuation component and the asymmetric information
component.
The empirical evidence on call auctions and their impact on price discovery
is mixed. Pagano and Schwartz (2003) and Pagano, Peng, and Schwartz (2013)
study the effect of the introduction of opening and closing call auctions on Euronext
Paris and Nasdaq, respectively. Both studies find that the introduction of call
auctions helped to improve price efficiency. Ellul, Shin, and Tonks (2005) study
traders’ choices between a dealership market and a call auction on the London
Stock Exchange. They find that while trading costs are generally lower for the call
auction, the dealership market has lower trading costs when the presence of insider
information is large. This contradicts the theoretical result of Madhavan (1992).
The present study is also related to the large literature devoted to estimating the
probability of information-based trading in continuous markets (see, e.g., Easley,
Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman, 1996; Duarte and Young, 2009; and Kryzanowski
and Tran, 2018). The present study is the first to estimate the difference in valuation
component and asymmetric information component in call auctions. The presence
of a significant asymmetric information component implies that call auction prices
incorporate insider information.
Finally, it should be noted that the insights of this study are not limited to
stock markets. The question of whether a call auction, or a uniform-price auction, is
preferable to sequential trade, or a discriminatory-price auction, is also important for
3
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electricity markets (Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord, 2006) and treasury auctions
(Binmore and Swierzbinski, 2000). By extending our understanding of the role
of asymmetric information in call auctions, this study contributes to this broader
literature on the design of institutions.
2 A Stylized Model of a Call Auction
The precise design of call auction mechanisms can vary considerably. For this anal-
ysis, we consider the most basic call auction algorithm. Traders can place limit
orders and market orders during the order accumulation phase. The order book is
closed, i.e., traders do not observe orders made by other traders during the order
accumulation phase.3 While market orders are executed with certainty (provided
there are orders on the other side of the order book), limit buy (sell) orders are only
executed when the associated limit price is higher (lower) than the transaction price.
The order accumulation phase ends at a specified time and the transaction price is
determined such that: i) all market orders execute and ii) all limit sell orders with
a limit price lower than the transaction price and all limit buy orders with a limit
price higher than the transaction price execute. If there is a range of prices that
satisfy these conditions the transaction price is the midpoint of this range. The asset
traded in this call auction and the traders participating in the auction are described
in the next subsection.
2.1 Model Assumptions
One risky asset is traded in the call auction. The asset’s true value at time t, νt,
follows a random walk with drift:
νt = µ+ νt−1 + εt , (1)
where µ is the drift parameter and εt ∼ N(0, σ2) reflects news potentially available
to an insider but unobservable to other market participants prior to the end of
3The assumption of a closed order book is not critical. The results of the theoretical analysis
remain valid if the order book was open.
4
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auction t.4 After auction t, the realization of εt becomes common knowledge. The
news shock, εt, is uncorrelated over time.
There are two types of risk-neutral liquidity traders: buyers and sellers. They
differ in their valuation of the stock. Buyers are willing to pay a premium on the price
of the stock while sellers demand a discount. These differences represent personal
portfolio considerations such as individual tax brackets and liquidity shocks (see
Foucault, 1999 and Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari, 2003).5 More specifically, buyer k
is characterized by a premium k she is willing to pay, where k is uniformly distributed
on the interval [k, k]. Hence, buyer k’s personal valuation of the asset is νt+k. Each
buyer submits one limit buy order for one unit of the asset. The decision problem
is to set an upper limit price bkt for the buy order to maximize the payoff
Ukb,t =

νt + k − pt if bkt ≥ pt,
0 if bkt < pt ,
(2)
where pt is the transaction price determined according to the rules specified above.
Similarly, there is a continuum of sellers characterized by a discount on the value
of the stock of size k.6 Seller k’s personal valuation of the asset is νt − k. Each
potential seller places one limit sell order for one unit of the stock with limit sell
price skt in order to maximize the payoff
Uks,t =

pt − (νt − k) if skt ≤ pt,
0 if skt > pt.
(3)
In addition, there is a potential insider. Dalko and Wang (2016) provide ample
evidence that, despite insider trading law, insider trading is prevale t in financial
4The drift parameter µ is not important for the theoretical analysis and might be set equal to
zero. However, it will later be useful as an interpretation of the intercept of the estimation model
in the empirical part.
5Alternatively, different premiums and discounts across liquidity traders can be thought of
reduced-form representations of differences in risk tolerance or divergent expectations (see Davis,
Pagano, and Schwartz, 2007).
6The assumption that there is a continuum of liquidity buyers and sellers is not crucial for our
main result that liquidity traders adjust their limit prices for the presence of an insider.
5
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markets around the world. With probabilities λ this trader learns the sign of the
realization of εt. The interpretation of such a signal is that the insider knows some
company-related news before it is revealed to the public, but she is uncertain about
the reaction of the market and hence the exact impact on the asset’s true value.
With probability 1− λ the insider does not receive a signal. In this case the insider
experiences a liquidity shock. A positive liquidity shock means the insider values
the stock at a premium of ki; a negative liquidity shock implies a discount of size
ki. Positive and negative liquidity shocks are equally likely.
The potential i sider is assumed to be risk-neutral and trades an amount of α
assets via market sell or market buy orders.7 Assuming a premium of ki her payoff
is
Ui,t =

α (νt + k
i − pt) for a market buy order,
α (pt − (νt + ki)) for a market sell order .
(4)
If the potential insider values the stock at a discount of ki the sign of ki in equation
(4) is reversed.
The presence of the potential insider serves two purposes: Firstly, for λ > 0,
it introduces asymmetric information into the model and secondly, it captures the
randomness of the order flow.8 While, on average, the number of buy and sell
orders are the same, in each particular auction, there is a positive or negative order
imbalance of size α. Hence λ measures the degree of information asymmetries and α
can be interpreted as the volatility of the order flow and, thus, provides a measure
for the liquidity of the market.
All traders are active for only one period. After an auction has ended a new,
identical group of traders arrives at the market.
7We will later show that, given an upper bound on α, the assumption that the potential insider
trades only via market orders can be dispensed with.
8In this sense the potential insider is very similar to the ‘large traders’ in Diamond and Verrecchia
(1991).
6
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3 Equilibrium Order Strategies and Implications
Given these three types of traders and the basic call auction algorithm described
above we obtain the following equilibrium:
Proposition 1 If the order imbalance is not too large, i.e., if
α ≤ min{(1− λ)
√
2/pi σ − k
2 (k¯ − k) ,
ki − k − λ√2/pi σ
2 (k¯ − k) } ,
the following strategies constitute an equilibrium:
 bkt = νt−1 + µ+ k + λ
√
2/pi σ ,∀k ∈ [k, k]
 skt = νt−1 + µ− k − λ
√
2/pi σ ,∀k ∈ [k, k]
 the insider places a market buy (sell) order when she observes a positive (neg-
ative) realization of the noise component or when she receives no information
and has a positive (negative) liquidity shock.
The upper bound on α ensures that the insider is indifferent between placing a
limit order or a market order, i.e., if she were to place a limit order, her limit price
would not be binding. The first part of the upper bound refers to situation where
the insider received a signal about the stock’s value. The second part corresponds
to the situation where the insider has no superior information but faces a liquidity
shock.
Proposition 1 shows that the liquidity traders’ limit prices consist of three parts:
(1) the asset’s unconditional expectation, E(νt) = νt−1+µ, (2) the personal premium
or discount, k, and (3) the informational impact of the potential insider trading in
the same direction, λ
√
2/pi σ. Note that it is not important that a liquidity trader
observes the order of the potential insider, because in equilibrium her limit price
can only be binding when the potential insider trades in the same direction. This
implies that the strategies in Proposition 1 are also an equilibrium when there is
transparency of the order book during the order accumulation phase.
There exist multiple equilibria, e.g., a buyer of type k > k + (k¯ − k)α can set
any limit buy price greater than νt−1 + µ+ k+ (k¯− k)α+ λ
√
2/pi σ since her order
7
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will always be executed and her limit price will never be binding. We are primarily
interested in transaction prices resulting from these equilibrium strategies and since
transaction prices are given by the limit prices of liquidity traders who know that
their limit prices are binding, these prices are unique.
[Figure 1 about here.]
3.1 The Transaction Price
Given the equilibrium strategies in Proposition 1, the order book of auction t can
be illustrated by one of the two panels in Figure 1. Figure 1(a) depicts the situation
where the potential insider places a market buy order. The market order shifts the
orders of the buyers α units to the right so that the last limit buy order that can
be executed is that of buyer k + (k¯ − k)α . The limit price of this buyer determines
the transaction price. Figure 1(b) shows the case where the potential insider sells.
Here the transaction price is the limit price of the seller with discount k+ (k¯− k)α .
We represent the two possible constellations of the order book with the indicator
variable qt: qt = 1 denotes a market buy order by the insider, qt = −1 denotes a
market sell order by the insider. Hence, the transaction price of auction t can be
written as
pt = νt−1 + µ+ (k + (k¯ − k)α) qt + λ
√
2/pi σ qt . (5)
Equation (5) highlights that transaction prices in a call auction incorporate asym-
metric information. They are a function of the probability that a trader has superior
information, λ, and of the value of that information,
√
2/pi σ. If qt = 1 , the transac-
tion price pt exceeds the unconditionally expected true value of the asset; if qt = −1 ,
pt falls below that value by the same amount. This symmetry of the transaction
price around the unconditional expectation of the asset’s true value leads to our
definition of transaction costs.
3.2 Measures of Transaction Costs
In continuous limit order book markets, transaction costs are measured by the bid-
ask spread. But there is no such generally accepted concept of transaction costs
8
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for call auctions. In call auctions, the bid-ask spread is defined as the difference of
the prices corresponding to the lowest limit sell and highest limit buy orders that
were not executed. Since, usually, no trade takes place at these prices, this concept
of the bid-ask spread is not appropriate for measuring actual transaction costs. As
an alternative, some studies use the measure proposed by Roll (1984) to estimate
transaction costs in call auctions (e.g. Haller and Stoll, 1989 and Stoll and Whaley,
1990).
We define transaction costs as the difference in the transaction price that would
result from a buy order by the potential insider and the price corresponding to a
market sell order. Of course, for each particular auction only one of these two prices
is observed.
Definition 1 Transaction costs in a call auction are defined as the difference be-
tween the two transaction prices that would result from a market buy order and a
market sell order, respectively:
S = pt(qt = 1)− pt(qt = −1) .
It should be stressed that this measure does not capture the transaction costs faced
by an individual trader.9 It reflects the deviation of transaction prices from the
unconditional expectation of the asset’s true value caused by order imbalances and
asymmetric information.
Plugging the expression for the transaction price (equation (5)) in our definition
of transaction costs we obtain an expression for transaction costs in call auctions.
Proposition 2 Transaction costs in a call auction are given by
S = 2(k + (k¯ − k)α) + 2λ
√
2/pi σ . (6)
Transaction costs consist of a ‘difference in valuation’ component, 2(k + (k¯ − k)α),
and an ‘asymmetric information’ component, 2λ
√
2/pi σ.
Thus, in a call auction market, transaction costs consist of two components. The
first component is the difference in valuation of the buyer with the lowest limit buy
9This is also pointed out in Theissen (2000).
9
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price and the seller with the highest limit sell price whose orders are being executed.
The second component is the asymmetric information component which is a positive
function of the impact of private information on the order book, λ, and the variance
of the potentially available news, σ2 (see, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). These
two components of transaction cost in a call auction have similar interpretations as
those Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2003) find for the bid-ask spread in continuous
limit order book markets. Note, however, that transaction costs in a call auction
are minimized for α = 0, whereas Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2003) show that
the bid-ask spread in continuous limit order book markets is largest for a zero order
imbalance.
Proposition 3 The difference in valuation component is increasing in the order
imbalance (α).
The asymmetric information component is increasing in (1) the probability that the
potential insider receives information, λ, and (2) the uncertainty of the asset’s value,
σ.
Proposition 2 and 3 are supported by empirical evidence from opening and clos-
ing auctions at the London Stock Exchange. Ellul, Shin, and Tonks (2005) find
that transaction costs in these auctions are increasing in the order imbalance and
asymmetric information.
Madhavan (1996) and Kehr, Krahnen, and Theissen (2001) define trading costs
as the difference between the two hypothetical transaction prices which result from
adding an additional market buy order and an additional market sell order of the
same size, say ∆ , respectively. For an order size equal to the order imbalance,
∆ = α, this definition is equal to the measure proposed in the present study.
3.3 The Transaction Return Process
We can use the expression of transaction prices in equation (5) to obtain the trans-
action returns. Taking the first difference of equation (5) and substituting equation
(1) yields
pt − pt−1 = µ+ (k + (k¯ − k)α)(qt − qt−1) + λ
√
2/pi σ (qt − qt−1) + εt−1 . (7)
10
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Letting rt = pt − pt−1 and using the expression of transaction costs in equation (6)
we obtain
rt = µ+
S
2
(qt − qt−1) + εt−1 . (8)
Equation (8) implies negative serial correlation between successive transaction re-
turns. The result that order imbalances lead to negative serial correlation in call
auction returns has been previously noted by Ho, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1985);
in the present model this negative correlation is further augmented by the asym-
metric information component.
Roll (1984) uses a return process similar to equation (8) together with the as-
sumption that εt−1 is uncorrelated with qt and qt−1 to derive the implicit bid ask
spread
SRoll = 2
√
−COV (rt, rt−1). (9)
In a call auction with asymmetric information, the insider’s behaviour introduces
a correlation between εt−1 and qt−1. Suppose the insider placed a buy order in
auction t. By Proposition 1 there are two possibilities: The insider learned that εt
is positive or the insider experienced a positive liquidity shock. Liquidity shocks are
uncorrelated with εt. But when the insider receives a signal, which happens with
probability λ, a buy order coincides with a positive realization of εt. Similarly, with
probability λ a market sell order (qt = −1) coincides with a negative realization of
εt. As a result, εt and qt are positively correlated. Thus, the Roll measure cannot
be used to measure transaction costs in call auctions when λ > 0.
The next section shows how equation (8) can be used to estimated transaction
costs and decompose them into a difference in valuation component and asymmetric
information component.
4 Estimation
When estimating equation (8) it should be noted that conditional on qt , εt is no
longer normally distributed. The distribution of εt given qt is normal with proba-
11
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bility (1− λ) and truncated normal with probability λ , i.e.
εt| qt =

qt · εt|(εt > 0) with prob. λ ,
εt with prob. (1− λ) .
(10)
Therefore, we estimate equation (8) using the following mixture model
rt = µ+
S
2
· (qt − qt−1) + ζt−1 · qt−1 · εt−1|(εt−1 > 0) + (1− ζt−1) · εt−1 , (11)
where, for each t, the latent variable ζt equals 1, if the insider received a signal about
the direction of εt, and zero otherwise. In this mixture model specification, λ is a
hyperparameter that represents the probability that ζt = 1 . Using the estimates
for λ and σ, we can calculate the asymmetric information component. Subtracting
the asymmetric information component from the estimated transaction costs, S, we
obtain the difference in valuation component.
The generalization that the order imbalance might be zero for a particular auc-
tion is easy to accommodate in our model. Although liquidity traders will adjust
their limit prices if they are able to observe that the potential insider does not trade,
equation (5) still holds if in the case of a zero order imbalance the transaction price
is the mid-point between the lowest limit buy and the highest limit sell price which
are being executed.
We estimate the mixture model of equation (11) with this extension. Of course,
ζt cannot equal 1 when qt = 0 and thus λ is the proportion of informed trades
relative to the total number of trades by the potential insider.
The prior distributions of the unknown parameters µ, S, λ and σ are chosen to be
noninformative. The joint prior of µ, S and σ is p(µ, S, σ) ∝ σ−2 and λ ∼ beta(1, 1).
Since the posterior distribution is not analytically tractable, we use numerical
techniques to draw inferences. Random draws from the joint posterior distribution
of the parameters are obtained using a Gibbs sampler with 3000 iterations, where
the draws of the first 1000 iterations are discarded. Tests with simulated data and
repeated estimation with different starting values have shown that this number of
iterations is enough for the Gibbs sampler to converge.
For each draw of S, λ and σ we calculate the asymmetric information component
Λ = λ
√
2/pi σ and difference in valuation component K = S2 − Λ . The mean and
12
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standard deviation of the marginal distributions of these parameters are presented
in Table 2.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Data
To illustrate estimation of the model we use data from the “Fixing” trading cate-
gory at Euronext Paris that consists of stocks that trade in two call auctions per day
only. As of January 2017 this trading category comprised 118 stocks, which make
up approximately 21% of all firms listed at Euronext Paris.10 For the analysis we
randomly chose twenty of the most actively traded companies. Data on transaction
prices as well as best bid and ask prices and trading volume are taken from the Paris
Intraday BBO-2006 data set which was purchased from Euronext NextHistory. Ta-
ble 1 presents summary statistics for these stocks for the period between 1/01/2006
and 31/12/2006.
There were 255 trading days in 2006. Thus, with two call auctions a day there
were 510 possible observations per stock. However, not all auctions had sufficient
demand and supply to facilitate trade. If the limit buy and limit sell orders of a
particular auction could not be matched, i.e., if there was no transaction price that
generated positive trading volume, this observation is discarded. Therefore only
auctions that resulted in a transaction price are considered. The number of auctions
varies across stocks between 45 and 488 (see the first column of Table 1).
The indicator variable qt is set to 1, if the transaction price of auction t is closest
to the best ask price that remains in the order book after the auction, and it is set
to -1, if the transaction price is closest to the best bid price.11 In some instances
10Euronext Paris assigns less actively traded stocks (fewer than 2,500 order book transactions
per year) to the “Fixing” category; presumably because these stocks would have very wide bid-
ask spreads, if they were traded continuously. Muscarella and Piwowar (2001), however, fail to
find significant improvements in liquidity for less actively traded stocks that move from continuous
trading to call auction trading.
11This procedure is analogous to trade indicator classification in continuous markets (see, e.g.,
13
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these three prices coincide. This can be interpreted as the potential insider not
participating in that day’s auction and thus all orders being executed. In these
cases the indicator variable is set to zero.
The second column of Table 1 shows the volatility of the transaction returns.
Volatility varies between 0.68 and 9.46 with an average of 2.44. Average prices vary
from ¿1.55 to ¿6118.35. Column four provides average bid-ask spreads in 2006,
where the bid-ask spread is defined as the difference between the lowest limit sell
and the highest limit buy price that remained in the order book after the auction
had cleared divided by their midpoint. Average bid-ask spreads range from 0.53%
to 15.81% with a cross-section average of 3.25%.
[Table 1 about here.]
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Transaction Costs
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation for each of the twenty assets. The
first column shows the estimated transaction costs. They vary between 0.40 and
5.45 with an average of 1.85. As expected, these actual transaction costs are, on
average, lower than the bid-ask spreads. The only two stocks for which transaction
costs exceed the bid-ask spread are Banque de la Reunio and Credit Agricole Oise.
This provides additional support for the claim that bid-ask spreads are not a good
measure of trading costs in call auctions since they overestimate actual costs.
[Table 2 about here.]
Kehr, Krahnen, and Theissen (2001) apply their measure of transaction costs to
the opening call auction of fifteen stocks on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in 1996
and find average transaction costs of 0.33 and 2.37 for small and large order sizes,
respectively.12 Thus, the estimates of transaction costs we obtain are roughly com-
Finucane (2000) for a discussion).
12Kehr, Krahnen, and Theissen (2001) also calculate transaction costs for the noon and closing
14
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parable with the previously-documented transaction costs in call auctions, especially
those for large order sizes.
5.2.2 The Difference in Valuation Component
The second column of Table 2 shows the difference in valuation component K =
k + (k¯ − k)α . The average difference in valuation component is 0.74 across the
twenty stocks. If traders within each group are relatively homogeneous, i.e., k¯ −
k is small, differences in valuation are largely attributable to personal portfolio
considerations and thus do not depend on the details of the trading mechanism.
With this assumption we can, therefore, check the results of our decomposition by
comparing the estimates of the difference in valuation with the estimates obtained
by Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2003) for the continuous limit order book market.
The average difference in valuation in the call auction mechanism is higher than the
estimates of the difference in valuation Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2003) find for
the continuous limit order book market on Euronext Paris but the difference is not
statistically significant.13
The decomposition of transaction costs by subtracting λ
√
2/pi σ from S2 is only
correct if liquidity traders assess the asymmetric information component correctly.
If liquidity traders underestimate the informational impact of the potential insider
by underestimating λ or σ, transaction costs will be too low. As a result the decom-
position attributes too large a component of transaction costs to asymmetric infor-
mation and the estimated difference in valuation component will be too small. The
fact that our estimate of the difference in valuation is comparable to and even higher
than the difference in valuation component found by Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari
(2003) suggests that, on average, liquidity traders correctly incorporate asymmetric
auction but the opening auction is the most appropriate auction to compare with pure call auction
trading, since it is preceded by the longest interval where no trading takes place.
13Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2003) assume two types of traders: one type values the stock
at Vh the other at Vl . The difference Vh − Vl relative to the mid-quote corresponds to 2K in the
present model. The average difference in valuation for their sample of 40 stocks on Euronext Paris
CAC40 index amounts to 1.04% compared to 2K = 1.48% for the 20 stocks in the present study.
15
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information in their limit prices.
5.2.3 Asymmetric Information Component
Column 3 reports the average asymmetric information component Λ = λ
√
2/pi σ .
The average over the twenty stocks is 0.18. It varies between 0.03 and 0.93. Since λ
is restricted to lie between 0 and 1 and σ is strictly positive, the asymmetric infor-
mation component, Λ, cannot be negative. Thus, we cannot assess the significance
of the asymmetric information component by looking at the t-statistics. But clearly,
Λ is significantly greater than zero, whenever λ is significantly greater than zero.
The average probability that the potential insider has superior information is
17% across the twenty stocks. For Credit Foncier Communal d’Alsace only 4% of
the orders submitted by the potential insider were triggered by inside information.
For Banque de la Reunion the potential insider was informed in 64% of the auctions
she participated in. Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2003) estimate the probability of
trading with an informed investor to be 34%, on average, ranging from 10% to 57%.
The large average probability seems to be specific to the sample of stocks considered
in their study. Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2003) focus on stocks in the CAC40
index, 40 of the most liquid stocks traded at the Paris Stock Exchange, for the period
January and February 1995. Lai, Ng, and Zhang (2014) estimate the probability of
informed trading (PIN) for 829 stocks traded on the Paris Stock Exchange during
the period from 1996 to 2010 using the procedure propose by Duarte and Young
(2009). They find an average PIN of 20.6% with half of the values between 14.9%
and 25.0%.
5.2.4 Model Comparison
By assumption, λ is continuously distributed between 0 and 1. Hence, the probabil-
ity that λ is exactly equal to zero is zero. We can, however, assess the significance
of λ by evaluating the Bayes Factor for the mixture model versus the restricted
model with λ = 0 . Note that the restricted model is a simple regression of rt on
a constant and qt − qt−1 with normally distributed disturbances. This is precisely
the transaction return process that Roll (1984) uses to derive his measure for the
16
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implicit spread. Thus, for λ = 0 our model collapses to the Roll model and Roll’s
measure for the implicit spread could be used to measure transaction costs in call
auctions.
If we ascribe equal prior probabilities to the competing models, the mixture
model and the restricted model, the Bayes Factor, BM,R , is the posterior odds
ratio. Then, BM,R/(1 +BM,R) is the implied posterior probability that the mixture
model is the correct model, i.e., λ > 0 . This probability is reported in the last
column of Table 2.14 The probability that λ is positive exceeds 85% for all stocks
in the sample. For nineteen stocks, λ is significantly positive at a 10%-level and
seventeen stocks show significant insider trading at a 5%-level.
Since the asymmetric information component is a linear function of the probabil-
ity of inside information in an auction, λ , the asymmetric information component is
significantly positive whenever λ is significantly positive. This shows that the asym-
metric information component should not be neglected, and thus, the Roll measure
does not fully reflect transaction costs in call auctions.
6 Determinants of Transaction Costs
Proposition 3 states that the difference in valuation component is an increasing
function of the relative order imbalance, α . The order imbalance is closely related
to liquidity. The more liquid the market, the smaller the relative size of the in-
sider’s order. We, therefore, expect a negative relationship between the difference
in valuation component and liquidity.
We use the following proxies for liquidity:15 trading volume in 2005, the number
of days in 2005 with zero returns (Zeros), the Roll measure defined in equation (9)
14We simulate the Bayes factor with the bridge sampling technique proposed by Meng and Wong
(1996).
15For a discussion of these and other liquidity measures and their performance see Goyenko,
Holden, and Trzcinka (2009). Czauderna, Riedel, and Wagner (2015) provides a good treatment of
the limitations of the Amihud illiquidity measure.
17
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and the Amihud illiquidity measure, defined as
Amihud = Average
( |rt|
V olumet
)
.
The liquidity measures for the 20 stocks are presented in columns 5 to 8 in Table 1.
Table 3 shows the correlations of the difference in valuation component, K, with
these proxies for liquidity. The number of trading days with zero returns and the
Amihud measure are strongly correlated with the difference in valuation component;
the correlation coefficients are 0.753 and 0.657, respectively. The correlation between
the Roll measure and the difference in valuation component is only marginally sig-
nificant. The correlation coefficient for trading volume has the expected sign but
fails to be significant.
[Table 3 about here.]
By Proposition 3, the asymmetric information component should not be directly
affected by liquidity. Table 3 confirms that the asymmetric information component
(Λ) is not related to any of the proxies for liquidity. As predicted by our model this
implies that the relation between liquidity and transaction cost is largely attributable
to the difference in valuation component. This is in contrast to Easley, Kiefer,
O’Hara, and Paperman (1996), who find that, for continuous trading on the NYSE,
the probability of informed trade was decreasing in trading activity. A possible
explanation for these conflicting results is that an increase in the number of liquidity
traders increases the number of trades in a continuous market, but not the number of
auctions in a call auction market. Holding the trading activity of insiders constant,
an increase in trades that are initiated by liquidity traders will then reduce the
probability of informed trading in continuous markets, but it will not change the
number of call auctions with insider information.
7 Conclusions
The analysis in this study shows that asymmetric information is reflected in the
liquidity traders’ limit prices and therefore affects transaction prices. Furthermore,
18
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our call auction model implies that, just as in continuous limit order book markets,
the presence of an insider gives rise to an asymmetric information component of
transaction costs. The empirical analysis finds strong support for our call auction
model with asymmetric information. The asymmetric information component forms
a substantial and significant part of transactions costs.
Based on these findings we conclude that call auctions are well equipped to deal
with asymmetric information. Liquidity traders are aware of asymmetric informa-
tion problems and they adjust their limit prices to prevent themselves from being
systematically exploited by traders with superior information.
Appendix
Proof 1 To see that Proposition 1 constitutes an equilibrium, consider a buyer of
type k∗ and suppose that all other traders play the equilibrium strategies given in
Proposition 1. If the limit order of buyer k∗ is binding, i.e. if buyer k∗’s limit price
determines the transaction price, the insider must have placed a market buy order.
Let qt be an indicator variable which is 1 if the insider places a buy order and -1 if
the insider places a sell order. The conditional expectation of εt given the insider’s
market buy order is E(εt| qt = 1) = λE(εt| εt > 0) = λ
√
2/pi σ .16 Therefore the
maximum price buyer k∗ is willing to pay is νt−1 + µ+ k∗ + λ
√
2/pi σ . If the buyer
chose a higher limit price, she might incur an expected loss, with a lower price she
might forgo expected profits. Thus, a limit buy price of νt−1 + µ+ k∗ + λ
√
2/pi σ is
buyer k∗’s best response.
A symmetric argument applies for sellers.
Now consider the potential insider who receives the signal εt > 0 and assume
that all liquidity traders follow the equilibrium strategies. If the insider chooses a
market buy order of size α the transaction price is the limit buy price of the buyer
with premium k = k + (k¯ − k)α, i.e. b∗t = νt−1 + µ + k + (k¯ − k)α + λ
√
2/pi σ .
16To see this, observe that the density of εt conditional on εt > 0 is
f(εt|εt > 0) = f(εt)/P (εt > 0) = 2f(εt) . Then, E(εt|εt > 0) = 2
∫∞
0
εtf(εt) dεt =√
2/pi [−σ exp{−ε2t/(2σ2)}]∞0 =
√
2/pi [0− (−σ)] =√2/pi σ .
19
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(See also Figure 1.) Therefore, the insider’s utility from a market order is Umi,t =
α [E(νt|εt > 0)− b∗t ] = α[(1− λ)
√
2/pi σ − k − (k¯ − k)α] .
If the potential insider chooses a limit order her utility is the same as for a
market order, whenever her limit price exceeds b∗t , and utility is zero for limit prices
lower than b
k
t = νt−1 + µ + k + λ
√
2/pi σ , because these orders will not execute. If
the insider chooses a limit price between these two prices her order is only partially
executed. The potential insider’s utility from a limit buy order with limit price bi is
U li,t =

α((1− λ)√2/pi σ − k − (k¯ − k)α), bi ≥ b∗t ,
bi−νt−1−µ−λ
√
2/pi σ−k
k¯−k (E(νt|εt > 0)− bi), b
k
t ≤ bi < b∗t ,
0, bi < b
k
t .
(12)
Maximizing equation (12) with respect to bi shows that the insider chooses a limit
price of b∗t or above and is therefore indifferent between a limit and a market order
whenever α ≤ (1−λ)
√
2/pi σ−k
2 (k¯−k) .
If the potential insider does not receive a signal but adds a premium ki to the
value of the stock her utility from a market buy order is Umi,t = α [E(νt) + k
i − b∗t ] =
α[ki − λ√2/pi σ − k − (k¯ − k)α] . The utility from a limit buy order with limit buy
price bi is
U li,t =

α(ki − λ√2/pi σ − k − (k¯ − k)α) , bi ≥ b∗t ,
bi−νt−1−µ−λ
√
2/pi σ−k
k¯−k (E(νt) + k
i − bi) , bkt ≤ bi < b∗t ,
0 , bi < b
k
t .
(13)
Maximizing equation (13) with respect to bi shows that the insider chooses a limit
price of b∗ or above and is therefore indifferent between a limit and a market order
whenever α <
ki−k−λ
√
2/pi σ
2 (k¯−k) .
Thus, the condition α ≤ min{ (1−λ)
√
2/pi σ−k
2 (k¯−k) ,
ki−k−λ
√
2/pi σ
2 (k¯−k) } ensures that the in-
sider chooses a market buy order when i) she observes a good signal and ii) she
receives no signal and adds a premium to the value of the stock. Due to the symme-
try of the situation the same condition applies for a market sell order.
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Proof 2 Plugging equation (5) into the definition of transaction costs, yields
S = νt−1 + µ+ k + (k¯ − k)α+ λ
√
2/pi σ − (νt−1 + µ− (k + (k¯ − k)α)− λ
√
2/pi σ)
= 2(k + (k¯ − k)α) + 2λ
√
2/pi σ.
Proof 3 Straightforward differentiation yields:
∂2(k + (k¯ − k)α)
∂α
= 2(k¯ − k) > 0
∂2λ
√
2/pi σ
∂λ
= 2
√
2/pi σ > 0
∂2λ
√
2/pi σ
∂σ
= 2λ
√
2/pi > 0 .
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Figure 1: The graphical representation of the order book and the transaction price.
In Panel (a) the potential insider places a market buy order of size α resulting in
transaction price p+t = νt−1 +µ+k+ (k¯−k)α+λ
√
2/pi σ . Panel (b) corresponds to
a market sell order and transaction price p−t = νt−1 + µ− k− (k¯− k)α− λ
√
2/pi σ .
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Table 3: Correlation between the components of transaction costs and liquidity
measures. This table reports the Spearman correlation coefficients. p-values are
given in parentheses.
Difference in Asymmetric infor-
valuation component mation component
Roll 0.382 0.340
(0.097) (0.143)
Amihud 0.657 0.063
(0.002) (0.792)
Volume -0.349 0.092
(0.132) (0.700)
Zeros 0.753 0.246
(0.000) (0.296)
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